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During the s there was considerable enthusiasm for currency boards, particularly
for small open economies, until the collapse of the Argentine system in – and
the subsequent decline of the USD.2 Since then, currency boards have been used
mainly by colonies and by Eastern European countries seeking to dispel the
shadow of chaotic monetary episodes by operating currency boards pegged to the
Euro. Table  shows that Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) is now
by far the largest economy to operate a currency board and no longer conforms
either to the colonial rationale or to the regime change rationale for a currency
board.3 This system has recently become more controversial because of the intensified
economic integration with the mainland, the decline of the USD on world markets
and the appreciation of the Chinese Renminbi (RMB) against the HKD since it
adopted a flexible basket peg in July .4 Several authors who have noted the
1 This paper was written while the author was a Research Fellow at the Hong Kong Institute for
Monetary Research. Part of the research for this project was undertaken as part of the ESRC
World Economy and Finance Programme, Grant RES--. I am grateful for the research
assistance of Niall MacKenzie, the archivists of the Bank of England, the HSBC Group Archive
London and HSBC Asia-Pacific Archive. I also benefited from comments from Leo Goodstadt,
Tony Latter and John Greenwood.
2 Kurt Schuler and Steve Hanke were the most vociferous advocates. K. Schuler, Should Developing
Countries Have Central Banks? Currency Quality and Monetary Systems in  Countries, Institute of
Economic Affairs, . S. Hanke, ‘Reflections on exchange rate regimes’, Cato Journal,  ().
3 Hanke finds that after HongKong did not operate a strict currency board because theHong Kong
Monetary Authority (HKMA) supervises banks and is committed to only % reserve backing for the
local currency. The financial secretary is also able to use the Exchange Fund to maintain financial and
monetary stability, but only ‘with a view to maintaining Hong Kong as an international financial
centre’. S. Hanke, ‘On dollarization and currency boards: error and deception’, Policy Reform,
 (), pp. –. However, since the Exchange Fund does publish a target of % cover and
does not regulate banks, we might consider it a currency board, although the HKMA takes on
other roles more similar to a central bank.
4 Ma et al. recently found that Hong Kong’s currency board peg to the USD resulted in poorer econ-
omic performance than Singapore’s managed floating regime. Y. Ma, Y. Y. Kueh and R. C. W. Ng,
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relatively poor performance ofHongKong compared to Singapore have recommended
a monitored band system similar to Singapore, although this advice came before the
RMB regime was changed.5 In this context, it is timely to reconsider why Hong
Kong abandoned the currency board under similar circumstances when their
anchor currency was depreciating on world markets, the RMB was appreciating
against the HKD and the international monetary system appeared on the brink of
disarray.
In its purist form, a currency board offers a cheap and automatic monetary mech-
anism whereby notes are passively issued and redeemed against foreign exchange at a
fixed exchange rate. The narrow money supply is thus determined by the inflow and
outflow of foreign exchange in response to the balance of payments and the govern-
ment is unable to exercise monetary discretion. Hong Kong’s system was originally
introduced in  along the pattern of the British colonial monetary system of
Table . Economies operating currency board or quasi-currency board systems, December 
Country GDP ($ billion) Currency peg
Djibouti . USD
Gibraltar [UK] . £
Faroe Islands [Denmark] . DKr
Cayman Islands [UK] . USD
Bermuda [UK] . USD
Brunei . Sing$
Bosnia . Euro
Estonia . Euro
Latvia  Euro
Lithuania . Euro
Bulgaria . Euro
Hong Kong [China]  USD
Falkland Islands [UK] n/a £
Saint Helena n/a £
Eastern Caribbean n/a USD
Source: Countries identified by Kurt Schuler, http://users.erols.com/kurrency/intro.htm
Note: Schuler excludes Latvia. GDP from CIA Yearbook and relates to  except Gibraltar,
Faroe Islands  and Cayman Islands, Bermuda  purchasing power parity.
‘A comparative study of exchange rate regimes and macro-economic stability in Singapore and Hong
Kong’, Singapore Economic Review,  (). For another critique of Hong Kong’s currency board see
Y. Wu, ‘A modified currency board system; theory and evidence’, Journal of International Financial
Markets, Institutions & Money,  ().
5 Paul Yip, ‘On the maintenance costs and exit costs of the peg in Hong Kong’, Review of Pacific Basin
Financial Markets and Policies,  (); R. S. Rajan and R. Siregar, ‘Choice of exchange rate regime:
currency board (Hong Kong) or monitoring band (Singapore)?’, Australian Economic Papers,  ().
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currency boards with funds managed in London by the Crown Agents for the
Colonies, pegged to sterling and holding at least  per cent sterling reserves.
From the s all colonial currency boards were legally entitled to invest their
resources in local assets, usually up to  per cent of total currency reserves, on the
basis that this part of the currency issue was unlikely ever to be presented for redemp-
tion.6 By the s, the Hong Kong Exchange Fund aimed to keep at least  per
cent nominal cover, but we shall see that the Fund’s investment strategy meant that
 per cent of its assets were illiquid, implying an expectation that only  per cent
of liabilities were likely to be presented for redemption – this proved a costly
mistake. Previous studies assumed that the excess over  per cent cover for liabilities
was routinely transferred to government accounts.7 This was not the case – a transfer
to the Development Loan Fund took place only once, in , although the financial
secretary claimed that assets in the Exchange Fund were earmarked for this purpose.
The Fund’s assets were all in sterling, held in London by the Crown Agents, and its
liabilities were denominated in HKD. This currency mismatch did not pose a risk
until the £/HKD exchange rate came under threat in .
When increasing the local supply of currency, the note-issuing banks (HSBC,
Chartered Bank [now Standard Chartered] and Mercantile Bank) credited the
Hong Kong Exchange Fund’s account in London with sterling and the financial sec-
retary issued in return HKD-denominated certificates of indebtedness (CoI) to the
value of these sterling deposits at the pegged exchange rate. The banks were then
entitled to issue this value of HKD notes. CoI could be redeemed through
the Exchange Fund at the cost of a slight exchange margin when the banks wanted
to withdraw notes from circulation. HSBC issued about  per cent of notes. The
Fund invested the sterling through the Crown Agents in London and received
the interest, using it to pay for the costs of printing, transport, cancellation etc. of
the excess note issue for HSBC and Chartered but not for Mercantile Bank. One
final aspect is the unusual governance of the Exchange Fund through the
Exchange Fund Advisory Committee (EFAC), comprised of the financial secretary
(chair), the accountant general (member and secretary) and representatives from
each of the note-issuing banks, with no outside participants. The accounts and pro-
ceedings were strictly confidential and not reported to the Legislative Council
(LegCo) or the Executive Council (ExecCo). EFAC routinely reviewed and accepted
the Annual Report and Balance Sheet of the Fund, advised on investment strategy and
during the late s was instrumental in amending the operations of the Fund.
When sterling was floated against the USD and other currencies in June ,
Hong Kong was faced with the choice of whether to maintain the peg to sterling
and float against most currencies, to float independently, or to peg to another cur-
rency. The decision was made to peg to the USD and at the same time to alter the
6 MemoM.MacColl for D. G. Holland,  July . The National Archives, London [hereafter TNA]
Foreign and Commonwealth Office [hereafter FCO]/.
7 T. K. Ghose, The Banking System of Hong Kong (Singapore, ).
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operation of the Exchange Fund so that it accepted HKD balances rather than sterling
as backing for the note issue. Note-issuing banks credited special deposit accounts ear-
marked for the Exchange Fund and received the equivalent value of certificates of
indebtedness against which they issued notes. Overnight, this marked the end of
the formal currency board rules that require foreign currency backing for the note
issue.8 By transferring the assets of the Exchange Fund from London to the Hong
Kong banking system, this innovation changed the nature of the monetary system
fundamentally. When the HKD floated free of its pegged rate in November ,
the government was left with no mechanism to control monetary expansion.
Several scholars have recently been critical of the abandonment of the strict currency
board rules in July  when certificates of indebtedness were allowed to be issued
against HKD balances rather than foreign exchange.9 They interpret this important
change as an unintentional response to immediate events, taken without a full under-
standing of the underlying consequences for monetary stability when there was no
central bank and no mechanism to control money and credit expansion. This
article examines this decision in its longer-term policy context and argues that it
was the culmination of a series of alterations to the operation of the Exchange
Fund during the collapse of the international monetary system from  onwards.
The main argument is that the Hong Kong government’s response to the crumbling
of the international monetary system was to make the Exchange Fund operate as
much more than a currency board well before . In particular, it was used to
provide forward cover for commercial banks, but this proved especially costly in
the volatile environment of the end of the global pegged exchange rate system, so
that in  the cover for currency issue fell from  to  per cent.
I
Breaking the currency board rule of issuing notes only against foreign exchange was
first considered five years before it was actually done. During the May  political
disturbances in Hong Kong, the note issue had to be expanded dramatically in
response to a run on banks.10 At the same time the Bank of China demanded to
buy large sums of sterling and this led the HSBC to identify a looming shortage of
sterling to meet these two demands. The issue of notes against HKD balances was
considered as a way to avoid the danger of a monetary contraction and to counteract
the sterling shortage. This was not in the end required, but the expansionary impact of
8 This was done without general discussion overnight on  July , contradicting the claims
by Feuerstein and Grimm that it takes time to eliminate a currency board. S. Feuerstein and
O. Grimm, ‘On the credibility of currency boards’, Review of International Economics,  ().
9 T. Latter,Hong Kong’s Money (Hong Kong, ); L. Goodstadt, Profits, Politics and Panics: Hong Kong’s
Banks and the Making of a Miracle Economy – (Hong Kong, ); J. Greenwood, Hong Kong’s
Link to the US Dollar: Origin and Evolution (Hong Kong, ).
10 For details on this episode see C. R. Schenk, ‘The empire strikes back: Hong Kong and the decline of
sterling in the s’, Economic History Review,  ().
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an HKD-backed note issue was clearly understood by J. J. Cowperthwaite as financial
secretary.
The HSBCmade a range of suggestions to government in early June , includ-
ing issuing notes without  per cent sterling backing, or issuing them for ‘free’
against the Exchange Fund’s surplus reserves. This memorandum was sent by the
Hong Kong government to the Colonial Office in London where Cowperthwaite
was due to arrive on  June. Back home, the Hong Kong government suggested
that HSBC pledge its own UK government securities rather than sterling cash
against CoI but this was quickly rejected. The chairman, F. J. Knightly, replied
‘our securities were part of the bank’s reserves as a whole and were not available to
meet a crisis inflation of the Note Issue. I have always thought therewas a trap attached
to this Note Issue role of ours.’11 In London, Cowperthwaite suggested to the Bank of
England that it would be legal for HSBC to pledge HKD balances as backing for
new note issue. This would merely require an administrative decision from
Cowperthwaite that he would be willing to make. Haslam of the Bank of England
suggested that HSBC should take up this solution and both George Stewart of the
London office andNorthcote (Chartered Bank) favoured this outcome if the situation
worsened.12 Stewart also reported to his Hong Kong office that the Crown Agents
were willing to lend part of the increase in the liquid sterling funds that arose from
the increased note issue back to the HSBC and Chartered Banks.13 It is not clear if
this was done, but it clearly would mark a departure from the monetary orthodoxy
of the currency board if this did occur.
Instead of these more radical departures, at the end of June the Hong Kong gov-
ernment deposited £ m on seven-day deposit with the HSBC, thus increasing
HSBC’s London sterling holdings from £ m to £ m to allow them to increase
the note issue or ‘feed’ the Bank of China if necessary.14 In the end, the crisis was
short-lived and currency returned to the banks so that the note issue was successfully
reduced as confidence returned. Nevertheless, this episode does establish that the issue
of CoI against HKD balances was considered in the context of avoiding a monetary
contraction. Although the details of the discussions are not available, it seems most
likely that the expansionary implications were understood at the time. This episode
also established that this practice would fall within the existing Exchange Fund
Ordinance, requiring only an administrative decision by the financial secretary
(taken ultimately in July ). The authorities did not take this step because the
monetary contraction ceased and a change of policy was not in the end required.
11 F. J. Knightly to G. O. W. Stewart in London,  June . HSBC Group Archive, London
[hereafter HSBC], ‘The Hong Kong situation’, Chairman’s files, /Box ..
12 E. Haslam, Bank of England to G. O. W. Stewart, HSBC,  June . HSBC, ‘The Hong Kong
situation’, Chairman’s files, /Box ..
13 G. O. W. Stewart to F. J. Knightly,  June . HSBC, ‘The Hong Kong situation’, Chairman’s
files, /Box ..
14 F. J. Knightly to J. A. H. Saunders,  June . HSBC, ‘The Hong Kong situation’, Chairman’s
files, /Box ..
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I I
On  November  sterling was devalued by . per cent, placing considerable
pressure on Hong Kong to determine its response. Initially, the Executive Council
agreed that the HKD should follow sterling. This outcome was described by
Holmer, a Bank of England official who was present at the meeting, as ‘a struggle
between the banking group and some officials, and the Chinese members who
were particularly concerned with the prospects of rising costs….The decision to go
with sterling was nevertheless reached within three-quarters of an hour after my with-
drawing from the Council room. The banking view seemed very quickly to
prevail.’15 A few days later, as public pressure increased over rises in the cost of
living, Holmer reported that ‘the administration had cold feet’ and on 
November Cowperthwaite announced a revaluation of  per cent against the
pound (from HKD to HKD.), amounting to a devaluation of . per cent
against the USD. At the same time, he privately asked for Bank of England support
in arranging (but not paying for) compensation to banks for initially making the
‘wrong decision’, although Holmer remarked that ‘to embark on a policy of compen-
sation without knowing the dimensions of the problem with any precision seems to
me to invite embarrassment’. At this point Hong Kong’s total sterling assets were
about £ m including outstanding sterling export contracts, so the devaluation
created an immediate loss of about £ m.16
Figure . Hong Kong M in  (monthly)
15 Telegram fromMr Holmer sent to the Treasury and the Bank of England, November . Bank
of England Archive [hereafter BE] OV/.
16 Letter from Cowperthwaite to Galsworthy,  February . TNA T/.
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Since banks stood to lose on the HKD value of their sterling assets from the reva-
luation, Cowperthwaite offered the HSBC and Chartered compensation out of the
reserves of the Exchange Fund. In LegCo on  November Cowperthwaite made
public his offer of a guarantee through the Fund for movements in the HKD/£
rate in  (this was news to P. A. Graham, manager at the Chartered Bank, who
first heard of the financial secretary’s intentions in the South China Morning Post).17
The HSBC recorded an oral undertaking by Cowperthwaite made in October
, when the USD value of sterling was under pressure.18 The rationale for com-
pensation was initially restricted to the note-issuing banks who had, ‘by convention’,
an obligation to buy and sell sterling on demand within a narrow range of exchange
rates. Compensation was not so easy to justify for other exchange banks except that
exchange control prevented them holding large liquid assets in any foreign currency
other than sterling. Unauthorised banks had no such claim. Cowperthwaite summar-
ised that ‘the principle it is proposed to apply is that net losses be met only in respect of
those transactions on which it was impossible for the banking system to cover its posi-
tion; and not in respect of those where cover could be obtained from customer or
otherwise even if this was not the general custom’.19
Of the total compensation eventually paid to authorised banks in  (£. m)
the HSBC received the lion’s share (£. m or HKD. m).20 In addition, HSBC’s
London Office compensation was £, (equivalent to HKD. m) paid on 
December .21 Hang Seng Bank (owned by HSBC) was particularly insistent
on receiving compensation because it had unwisely built up its sterling balances in
London just prior to the devaluation for commercial purposes and to take advantage
of high interest rates there.22 After much lobbying, late in  Cowperthwaite
agreed that the Fund should compensate six unauthorised banks’ losses to a total of
£,, paid in early .23 The HKD value of the Exchange Fund’s assets fell
by the equivalent of £ m in  and then total compensation to banks amounted
to £. m over the next two years, resulting in a total cost of £. m or . per
cent of total assets in .
17 See correspondence between P. A. Graham of Chartered Bank and Cowperthwaite, – December
. HSBC, Chairman’s files, /Box .. LegCo  November .
18 This oral undertaking was confirmed in a letter from J. A. H. Saunders to Cowperthwaite, March
. HSBC, Chairman’s files, /Box ..
19 Financial secretary memo,  December . HSBC, Chairman’s files, /Box ..
20 The Hongkong Bank only expected to get HKD. m. Half-yearly report, Hongkong Bank,
December . HSBC GHO. F. H. H. King, The Hongkong Bank in the Period of Development
and Nationalism, – (Cambridge, ), p. .
21 H. Wardle, secretary EFAC, to J. A. H. Saunders, manager HSBC Hong Kong,  December .
HSBC, Chairman’s files, /Box ..
22 See correspondence between Q. W. Lee, chairman of Hang Seng Bank, and Cowperthwaite in
January and February  in HSBC GHO/.
23 Report on the Accounts of the Exchange Fund . TNA FCO/.
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In March , as the international monetary system was rocked by the Gold Pool
Crisis, the HSBC’s overbought position in sterling was accumulating quickly and they
wrote to Cowperthwaite seeking cover if the HKD/£ rate increased again. In
response, Cowperthwaite offered to use the borrowing powers of the Fund (then
HKD m) to engage in a forward swap to provide cover. The Fund would
borrow HKD from HSBC; HSBC would then sell an equivalent amount of sterling
to the Fund with a repurchase contract set at the prevailing exchange rate. The Fund
would pay interest on this borrowing at the interbank rate.24 This met with a favour-
able response at HSBC, but it is not known whether the deal was implemented.
What is important, however, is that this initiated the use of the financial secretary’s
borrowing powers through the Exchange Fund to offer forward cover to banks.
The correspondence at this time referred on both sides to the HSBCs responsibilities
as a ‘quasi-central bank’ for Hong Kong to protect the HKD/£ exchange rate.
The Fund’s compensation agreement for banks counteracted the deflationary
impact of revaluation of the HKD and established that the Exchange Fund was
responsible for the effects of exchange rate variation on banks, although not yet for
direct intervention in the exchange market. As the international monetary system
crumbled, this responsibility became more acute and more costly.
I I I
In the months after the devaluation, the Hong Kong government lobbied successfully
to be the only sterling area member to receive any form of future exchange guarantee
for their sterling holdings.25 The rationale from the British point of view was not only
the statutory requirement for the colony to hold sterling assets, but also the very large
volume of sterling held by private banks, which Cowperthwaite threatened would
be dumped on the market if there was no cover for official assets. In May 
the British Treasury agreed to issue £ m−£ m worth of seven-year non-
negotiable HKD bonds in exchange for  per cent of Hong Kong’s sterling assets,
effectively covering the HKD value of this proportion of Hong Kong’s sterling
reserves in the event of a depreciation of sterling against the HKD. As part of the
agreement, the Hong Kong government agreed not to revalue the HKD unilaterally,
so the scheme only protected Hong Kong from a general realignment of sterling’s
parity similar to the  devaluation. Executive Council members accepted this
proposal only very reluctantly since they wanted a USD guarantee.
On  June the Exchange Fund spent £. m to buy HKD mworth of the
bonds, transforming the nature of their assets. The impact on the Exchange Fund was
to break the guidelines set by EFAC in June  for the investments of the Fund;
which were that assets to the value of the CoI should be invested  per cent in
24 J. A. H. Saunders to Cowperthwaite,  March  and reply  March , HSBC, Chairman’s
files, /Box ..
25 For details of the negotiations see Schenk, ‘The empire strikes back’.
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the Joint Colonial Fund (liquid),  per cent in securities up to five years’ maturity
and  per cent in long-dated securities chosen to maximise yield. In addition, the
proceeds of all new CoI should be held liquid for three months. The first £ m of
any surplus assets should be liquid, the next £ m invested in securities up to five
years and the rest in long-dated securities. Liquid assets were thus held outside the
domestic banking system in the Joint Colonial Fund managed by the Crown
Agents in London, and  per cent of the assets were illiquid. In April  EFAC
further agreed that the Crown Agents be instructed that all investments should be
in British securities (i.e. British government or local and public authorities) and
none in other Commonwealth stock.26
In the Fund’s accounts, the new HKD bonds were treated as liquid assets, although
they were qualitatively different from liquid assets in the Joint Colonial Fund. The
bonds could be liquidated by the Exchange Fund for ‘reasons of liquidity’ without
consulting with London, but otherwise they could only be sold after mutual agree-
ment with the British government. Any bonds prematurely redeemed also earned a
punitive interest rate of about  per cent below the National Loan Fund rate in the
first three years, falling to . per cent below this rate once the full term was
reached in seven years. The HKD bond purchase overwhelmed the Exchange
Fund’s accounts, completely liquidating the Fund’s holding of short-term securities,
replacing one-third of long-dated securities as well as reducing the liquid assets in the
Joint Colonial Fund. The Crown Agents were asked to sell the shorter end of the
longer-term securities to minimise losses on yields, but it was estimated that with
the National Loan Fund rate at  / per cent, the cost in loss of interest of taking
up £ m of the bonds would be about £, p.a. on the yield to redemption
of the current investments.27 Importantly for the next stage in the Exchange Fund’s
innovation, in order to take up the issue the Exchange Fund ordinance was revised to
increase the borrowing power of the Fund from HKD m to HKD m. Table 
shows that the HKD Bonds made up over  per cent of the Exchange Fund’s total
assets in June . On  September  the HKD bonds were redeemed without
interest penalty when a new sterling agreement came into force and the proceeds
(£. m) were reinvested in sterling securities by the Crown Agents on behalf of
the Fund.28
Although short-lived, the London HKD bond scheme had an important effect on
the evolution of the Exchange Fund. Because of the low market value of long-dated
securities, thesewere no longer very liquid and it was noted in EFAC that selling them
to buy HKD bonds would result in losses.29 In mid June , Cowperthwaite
26 Minutes of EFAC meeting on  April . HSBC, Chairman’s files, /Box .. The Fund
held £. m in Commonwealth stock in April , Report on Exchange Fund accounts .
TNA FCO/.
27 Minutes of EFAC meeting  June . HSBC, Chairman’s files, /Box ..
28 EFAC memo for meeting on  October . HSBC, Chairman’s files, /Box ..
29 Minutes of EFAC meeting  June . HSBC, Chairman’s files, /Box ..
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proposed a scheme to allow the Exchange Fund to take over short-term sterling assets
from note-issuing banks to buy the bonds. He suggested that HSBC and Chartered
should supply the Fund with sterling to a total of about £ m shared  to  by
each bank respectively. In return, the Fund would issue non-negotiable one-year
HKD bonds at . per cent interest p.a. that would be freely convertible into certi-
ficates of indebtedness to back any necessary expansion of the note issue (i.e. the Fund
would forego its exchange margin).30 TheHSBC sharewas £ m and the Chartered
was to take up the other £ m. The banks agreed these terms at the end of June and
HSBC proposed to take up £ m of the Fund bonds by  July.31 By this time,
however, London had new proposals for all sterling asset holders that replaced the
London HKD Bonds and the scheme was not implemented.32 Nevertheless, this
strategy was soon offered to all banks as a way to take their sterling assets into the
USD/£ guarantee on official sterling assets offered by London in July.
IV
The subsequent Sterling Agreement between Hong Kong and the UK was one of 
similar agreements negotiated in the summer of  in which signatories agreed to
keep a minimum proportion of their reserve in sterling (MSP) in return for an
exchange guarantee of the USD value of  per cent of their official government-
held sterling reserves. These guarantees in turn were backed by a line of credit of
USDbn provided by G central banks through the Bank for International
Table . Exchange Fund investments  (£ million, % in parentheses)
 June

 June

October

November

Liquid in Joint Colonial
Fund
. (%) . (%) . (%) . (%)
–-year securities . (%) . . (%) . (%)
–-year securities . − − −
Long-dated securities . (%) . (%) . (%) . (%)
HKD bonds issued by
HMG (-year)
. (%)
Total . . . .
Source: Exchange Fund investments, memo for EFAC meeting  October . HSBC
Group Archive, Chairman’s files, Box ..
30 J. J. Cowperthwaite to J. A. H. Saunders, HSBC,  June . HSBC, Chairman’s files,
/Box ..
31 J. A. H. Saunders to J. J. Cowperthwaite,  July . HSBC, Chairman’s files, /Box ..
32 Cowperthwaite speech in LegCo,  November .
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Settlements (the Basle Agreement). Hong Kong’s MSP was set at  per cent, the
highest of any signatory. Their situation was complicated, however, by the lack of
a central bank, which meant that some of the sterling held privately in Hong Kong
was actually held for official purposes. This pertained particularly to the sterling hold-
ings of note-issuing banks which were obliged to buy sterling in the market to keep
the official exchange rate stable, and to keep liquid balances in sterling to buy CoI if
the note issue had to be increased – as in the May  crisis. When the Sterling
Agreement was negotiated, Cowperthwaite confirmed with the Secretary of State
for the Colonies that ‘there would be no objection to local arrangements being
made to enable private bank funds to be taken into official reserves’.33
FromNovember , Hong Kong was the largest single official holder of sterling,
which made it a major beneficiary from the London USD guarantee. In December
 Hong Kong held £. m of official sterling, Australia £. m and
Kuwait £. m. Figure  shows how official reserves increased quickly in the
early s as the Hong Kong economy boomed.
V
Because the banks’ sterling assets could only be included under the London guarantee
if they were transformed into deposits of the Exchange Fund, bringing the sterling
holdings of banks into the £/USD guarantee required swaps of £ for HKD
between the Exchange Fund and these banks. A scheme was put to the Exchange
Fund Advisory Committee at its meeting at the end of October  to be offered
to all authorised and unauthorised banks. The Fund borrowed HKD from the
banks in return for a non-negotiable, non-interest-bearing debt certificate (CoI).
The Fund used the HKD cash to buy an equivalent amount of the banks’ sterling
assets, which would then be re-deposited with the banks on account of the Fund.
In this way, banks swapped their sterling assets for an HKD-denominated claim on
the Fund and the Fund acquired the sterling assets of the banks while leaving them
on deposit for the banks to use as they wished. The intention was that the banks
would treat the sterling liability as if it were still a sterling asset. To confirm this,
the Fund was originally not allowed to initiate redemption of sterling deposits until
the facility expired on  September . This was subsequently changed to one
months’ notice but Cowperthwaite promised that ‘the likelihood of this ever being
done is very remote’.34 The banks, however, could buy or redeem the HKD CoI
at any time. In addition, the note-issuing banks could exchange their HKD CoI
for sterling CoI whenever the note issue was expanded and vice versa without
further exchange cost. The sterling CoI would then be a liability of the Fund, and
33 Extract from telegram between Hong Kong and Secretary of State,  September . HSBC,
Chairman’s files, /Box ..
34 Note for Executive Council, Sterling Exchange Guarantees,  January . TNA FCO/.
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the matching asset would be the sterling on deposit with the note-issuing bank. The
balance sheet implications are suggested in Tables  and .
Predictably, the banking members of the EFAC generally welcomed the proposal,
although they objected to the cost of the cover, which included an exchange margin
for the Fund on the redemption of the HKD certificates of / penny plus / per
cent p.a. interest to be paid on the Fund’s sterling deposits at the banks.35 It was
also agreed that cover for head office funds of Hong Kong based banks should be
negotiated between the Fund and the bank. The banking members of EFAC also
wanted the Fund to provide more general forward cover facilities for commercial
transactions.36 The deal agreed for the London office of HSBC was that the
Exchange Fund would take over £ m of their sterling along the lines of the
Hong Kong scheme but it would be only  per cent guaranteed (equal to
the London government guarantee). The HSBC London branch duly opened a
deposit account for the Fund to re-deposit the sterling.37
In early December , the financial secretary explained to the Secretary of State
for the Colonies that in order to bring commercial banks’ sterling assets into the
British government exchange guarantee ‘our intention is that Exchange Fund
borrow HKD from banks, purchase their eligible sterling assets therewith and
Figure . Hong Kong official sterling reserves, December 1968–February 1972
Source: TNA T/.
35 Letter from J. A. H. Saunders (HSBC), P. A. Graham (Chartered Bank) and W. K. Dargie to
J. J. Cowperthwaite,  November .
36 Minutes of Exchange Fund Advisory Committee,  October . HSBC, Chairman’s files,
/Box ..
37 J. J. Cowperthwaite to M. W. Turner, HSBC,  December . HSBC, Chairman’s files,
/Box ..
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re-deposit in sterling with banks. There would be strict provisions to ensure that
banks were at all times firm holders of underlying sterling assets of type eligible for
guarantee in amount of at least exchange fund sterling deposits with them.’38 The
scheme required increasing the Exchange Fund’s statutory borrowing limit above
HKDbn, and it was raised to HKDbn on  December.
The scheme was finally offered to the Exchange Banks’ Association at the end of
January  and implemented in March with slightly more generous terms after
protests at EFAC. Cowperthwaite insisted that because of the gap between the 
per cent guarantee offered to banks by the Fund and the  per cent guarantee
offered by the UK, there should be a charge to recognise the risk borne by the
Fund. The Fund charged an exchange margin of /d on issue of the HKD debt
certificates payable by banks to the Fund in sterling. The debt certificates would be
interest free. The banks would also pay / per cent p.a. interest on Exchange
Fund sterling deposits with banks, payable semi-annually in sterling. The agreement
was to last until  September  when the UK sterling agreement was due to
Table 3. Issue of HKD CoI to banks
Bank balance sheet
Assets Liabilities
−£ sold to Fund +£ deposit by Fund
+HKD claim on Fund
Exchange Fund balance sheet
Assets Liabilities
+£ deposit at bank +HKD CoI
Table 4. Exchanging HKD CoI for £ CoI
Note-issuing bank balance sheet
Assets Liabilities
−HKD CoI +HKD cash
+£ £ CoI £ Deposit by Fund
Exchange Fund balance sheet
Assets Liabilities
+£ deposit at bank −HKD debt certificate
+ £ CoI
38 Telegram from Kong Kong to Foreign Office (hereafter FCO) re: Exchange Fund amendment bill,
 December . TNA FCO/.
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expire. If the £/HKD rate changed more than  per cent for  continuous days, the
Fund was liable to pay compensation within  days thereafter. With respect to the
sterling deposits, J. G. Paterson, the Hong Kong Banking Commissioner, confirmed
to Chartered Bank that ‘the assets placed at the disposal of the Exchange Fund will
continue to be regarded as the property of your bank’ and would be guaranteed by
the Exchange Fund.39
Before the schemewas even offered to the local banks (or described to London) the
Exchange Fund was forced to activate it to provide forward cover during a sterling
exchange crisis in November . The Fund took over £ m of sterling assets
from the three note-issuing banks plus the Bank of East Asia. By  November
the HSBC held £ m on deposit for account of the Exchange Fund against
non-interest-bearing HKD certificates of indebtedness for HK$.b; and Chartered
held a further £ m in deposits on the same terms. The agreement at this point
allowed the position to be reversed in two months’ time without charge.40 The
Governor Sir David Trench alerted the Foreign Office that without this swap of
HKD for sterling, these banks might have refused to continue to buy sterling in
the market to keep the rate fixed. Trench explained that
This action was necessary not only for Hong Kong’s protection but also to prevent a situation
arising where there was no official buyer of sterling (a role played by the note-issuing banks)
and it went to a substantial discount. The note-issuing banks had to absorb large quantities of
sterling, mostly from other banks and the Bank of China stopped buying temporarily. The
note-issuing banks could not be expected to carry on without protection and we could
give it them only in this way. As it was they had to assume substantial forward risks in
respect of export contracts. Because of this arrangement it was possible to keep the HKD/
£ market open throughout the crisis. The arrangement has been kept confidential.41
This operation required the Fund to exceed its statutory borrowing limit, which had
to be ratified retrospectively by London, causing some consternation in the Treasury.
The Exchange Fund guarantee scheme was finally launched on  March ,
when the Fund borrowed over £ m from the banks and then a further £ m
over the next three months, bringing the total by the end of May to £ m.
Altogether,  banks participated including foreign banks and four unauthorised
banks, although  per cent was held by note-issuing banks and their subsidiaries
(HSBC, Chartered and Hang Seng Bank).42 No Communist banks took part.
London worried that there was no limit to the amount of sterling the Fund could
39 D. L. Millar of Chartered Bank to M. W. Turner enclosing a copy of memo given to him by
J. G. Paterson,  June . HSBC, Chairman’s papers /Box ..
40 J. A. H. Saunders, chief manager, to J. J. Cowperthwaite,  November . M. G. R. Sandberg,
manager Chartered Bank, to J. J. Cowperthwaite,  November . HSBC, Chairman’s files,
/Box ..
41 Telegram from Sir D. Trench to FCO,  December . TNA FCO/.
42 Telegram from J. J. Cowperthwaite to T. J. O’Brien, FCO, March . TNA FCO/. Note
of meetings at the Treasury in London – May . Cowperthwaite,  June . HSBC,
Chairman’s files /Box ..
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borrow from the banks and that there was no control on foreigners transferring ster-
ling to Hong Kong banks to take advantage of the guarantee. They tried to get
Cowperthwaite to set an upper limit, a request he dismissed as ‘arbitrary use of the
Secretary of State’s powers’.43 Setting an upper limit could bring into question the
convertibility of HKD to sterling since the commercial banks’ access to the scheme
was vital to their continued participation in the sterling market. As in November,
the scheme was justified because otherwise banks would stop buying sterling at the
official rate, ‘which would have incalculable effects in the colony on confidence in
sterling’. By  May the Fund’s borrowing had reached HKD m out of its
limit of HKDbn and Cowperthwaite asked for the limit to be increased to
HKD. or HKDbn.44 London refused and the stage was set for confrontation. In
the meantime, the scheme was continued by transferring just over £ m of the
Fund’s revenue reserves from HK dollar bank accounts into sterling.45
With no recourse to the Exchange Fund swap to cover their sterling holdings, on 
May HSBC suspended further forward purchases of sterling against export contracts
and Cowperthwaite advised London that other banks would probably follow because
‘they are no longer prepared to take the exchange risk involved’.46 Peterson and
Cowperthwaite set off for London for talks at the end of May to resolve the impasse,
holding meetings at the Treasury described by Cowperthwaite to the EFAC as ‘a
rather extraordinary affair’. In the end, the British were persuaded that the increase in ster-
ling assets was due mainly to an export boom rather than capital inflow to take advantage
of the guarantee, but that therewas noway tomake sure that all the sterling in the scheme
was fromHongKong residents. They agreed to lift the borrowing limit for the Fund, but
the negotiations for howmuch commercial bank sterling the Fundwould be able to swap
for HKD with the commercial banks, which banks would participate, and what would
happen to the sterling assets so acquired, lasted until March .
The final agreement was that  per cent of the sterling acquired from the three
largest participating banks (HSBC, Chartered and Hang Seng Bank) would be put
on deposit in London for the account of the Fund.47 In this way the UK felt more
confident that the sterling was legitimately on official account but it did not limit
the banks’ use of this sterling since it was merely deposited with the banks’
London offices. EFAC accepted the British proposal to earmark funds in London,
although the minutes of the meeting of  June report that ‘some doubt was,
however, expressed that so simple and seemingly pointless a manoeuvre could be
43 Richard Hay, FCO, to Turner, Bank of England,  April . TNA FCO/.
44 Telegram from Hong Kong to FCO,  May . TNA FCO/. Minute of EFAC,  June
. HSBC, Chairman’s papers, /Box ..
45 Minute of EFAC,  June . HSBC, Chairman’s papers, /Box ..
46 Telegram from Trench to FCO,  May . TNA FCO/. J. J. Cowperthwaite to J. A. H.
Saunders,  March . HSBC, Chairman’s files, Box ..
47 The UK insisted that / of the sterling eligible for the London guarantee should be on deposit in
London. The % of banks’ sterling was determined to reach this level. Minutes of EFAC 
September . HSBC, Chairman’s papers /Box ..
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all that was really demanded’. Philip Haddon-Cave later referred to it as an ‘Alice in
Wonderland exercise’.48 By the end of March, HSBC had earmarked £ m at their
London office for account of the Exchange Fund.49
One of the implications of the new schemewas the need to increase the borrowing
powers of the Exchange Fund dramatically. In May  ExecCo was asked to
approve an increase from HKDb to HKD.b which was agreed in June. In
August  the Governor wrote to London to change the Exchange Fund
Ordinance to allow LegCo to grant increases in borrowing powers to the Fund on
advice of Financial Secretary and still with the approval of the Secretary of State for
the Colonies.50 Approval was finally granted in March . On  September 
they asked for a further increase from HKD m to HKD m (£ m).
Table  shows the growth in the Fund’s borrowing powers.
London allowed Hong Kong to diversify its total reserves from  to  per cent
sterling from September  but they did not take up this opportunity before sterling
floated downward in June . By the end of July the ratio had fallen to . per
cent, to . per cent by the end of August and . per cent by the end of
September.51 As part of a general review of investment policy, on  May 
(i.e. a month before sterling floated) the EFAC agreed to recommend that the
Fund should be able to invest in ‘foreign currencies and foreign government
bonds, foreign government guaranteed bonds, and bonds issued by foreign organis-
ations similar to UK local authorities’ and the approval of the Secretary of State
was sought.52 The Exchange Fund Ordinance already allowed the purchase of
foreign currency other than sterling and this was undertaken before the Secretary
of State’s approval to buy non-sterling securities was granted.53 In the end, because
of the high interest obtainable in London the EFAC decided not to buy any non-
sterling securities during  or  although they did switch some cash assets.
We will see below that the illiquidity of the long-term assets inhibited diversification.
One last wrinkle to the story is that the Smithsonian Agreement of December 
revalued sterling against the USD to USD./£ from USD./£ but the London
guarantee threshold was not changed, effectively making it inoperable until sterling
had depreciated at least  per cent rather than the  per cent indicated under the
initial terms. This exposed the Hong Kong government to a further liability since
their guarantee was in terms of the current HKD/£ rate. Mike Sandberg, as a
48 Minutes of EFAC,  June . Note by M. Curran reporting phone call from Haddon-Cave,
 August . HSBC, Chairman’s files, /Box ..
49 M. Curran, deputy chairman HSBC, to financial secretary, March . HSBC, Chairman’s files,
/Box ..
50 TNA FCO/.
51 TNA T/.
52 Minutes of EFAC,  May . HSBC, Chairman’s files, /Box ..
53 HK Exchange Fund, Report on the accounts for the year ended  December . HSBC,
Chairman’s files /Box ..
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member of EFAC, asked that the Governor should raise this issue with London.54 But
the possibility of adjusting the guarantee threshold was quickly dismissed in London
despite the claims of several other central banks that this violated the spirit if not the
letter of the sterling agreements.55 This had important effects on Hong Kong because
it reduced the government’s cover for their HKD guarantee of banks’ sterling
holdings.
VI
On  July , two weeks after sterling floated on  June, the Hong Kong govern-
ment decided to switch their exchange rate peg from sterling to the USD. This was
greeted with equanimity in London, no doubt because diversification of their reserves
was still limited by agreement to  per cent.56 The HSBC had not been approached
for advice in advance and was critical of the decision. The Hong Kong manager,
M. G. R. Sandberg, told Haddon-Cave that
cutting ourselves off from sterling, however tempting it might seem to set theHKDup as an inde-
pendent currency instead of merely an adjunct of sterling which it has always been, was taking a
risk when practically all our reserves are in sterling. Secondly, with the almost total lack of
exchange control regulations here speculation against the HKD (whether as an over or an under-
valued currency) could be a Gnome of Zurich’s dream and a Financial Secretary’s nightmare.57
Sandberg believed Haddon-Cave had chosen the USD rate of HKD. with
margins of HKD. and HKD. ‘arbitrarily’ and that it was too high, especially
Table 5. Financial secretary’s borrowing limit for Exchange Fund
HKDm £m equivalent
Prior to July   
July   
November   
December   
June   
October   
May   
June   
54 J. A. H. Saunders to financial secretary as chairman of EFAC,  January . HSBC, Financial sec-
retary re: devaluation and compensation -, Chairman’s papers, /Box ..
55 C. R. Schenk, ‘Malaysia and the end of the Bretton Woods system; disentangling from sterling
–’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History,  ().
56 A. K. Rawlinson to Bell for the Chancellor,  July . TNA T/.
57 M. G. R. Sandberg to G. M. Sayer reporting on conversation with Haddon-Cave,  July . HSBC,
Financial secretary re: devaluation and compensation –, Chairman’s papers, /Box ..
THE EVOLUTION OF THE HONG KONG CURRENCY BOARD 
when the government had no USD to intervene when required. The local USD
market was not big enough to provide enough dollars so sterling would have to be
sold in London for the funds to intervene in the exchange market.
On  February  the USD was devalued by  per cent and the Executive
Council met on  February to decide that the HKD should retain its gold parity
and be revalued by . per cent against the USD. In March  there was a
further global run on the USD and, from this time, most European currencies and
the Yen floated against the USD (the Yen had floated in February ). The
HKD/USD came under increasing pressure in May, but by July the Fund was
purchasing USD back from the market to keep the HKD at its upper band.
By the end of  the Fund had about  per cent of its call money in USD
compared with about  per cent in , and  per cent of its fixed deposits in
USD compared with  per cent in . Still, only  per cent of total assets were
denominated in USD, leaving  per cent in sterling.
Changing the anchor currency did not precipitate a major shift in the currency
denomination of the Exchange Fund’s assets because the market value of sterling
securities was very low in  and diversification would have entailed substantial
losses. The strategy of investing  per cent of the Fund’s assets in long-dated securities
proved costly as London interest rates rose and the gilt market fell. In  the depre-
ciation of HMG assets amounted to £. m and in  to £. m. From the end of
 to the end of  the Financial Times government securities index fell from
. to . so that by the end of  the nominal value of the longer-term
portion of the reserves was £. m but the market value was just £. m.58
Nevertheless, when the market seemed relatively strong at the start of , £ m
of gilts were sold to generate the funds for the compensation payments due later in
the year.
At the same time as sterling floated, the sterling area system was disbanded. This
meant that authorised banks were no longer excluded from holding positions in cur-
rencies other than sterling, which undermined the rationale for the government to
cover banks’ sterling holdings.59 It also appears to have released HSBC from its obli-
gation to use its own resources to defend the exchange rate. As soon as the new peg
was announced, a line was drawn on outstanding HKD debt certificates so that there
was no increase and no redemption, but banks were required to keep paying interest
on their Fund sterling deposits.60 Any future compensation would be paid on  per
cent of the banks’ sterling holdings as of  July even if they reduced them in the mean-
time. At this point, total debt certificates outstanding were at the maximum level in
58 Balance sheet of Exchange Fund for . TNA FCO/. Balance sheet of Exchange Fund for
. TNA FCO/.
59 LegCo,  December .
60 Letter from Haddon-Cave to D. L. Millar, chairman of Exchange Banks Association,  July .
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terms of the Exchange Fund borrowing limit of HKD m. Predictably, the
decision to freeze the HKD certificates was greeted with indignation by the banks
and this was soon to be compounded by delays over compensation.61
Sterling quickly fell below the  per cent threshold against the HKD on  July and
payments under the guarantee came due to be paid on  October , but the gov-
ernment tried to delay settlement. Based on a disputed reading of the terms of the agree-
ment that referred to compensation in relation to ‘the new parity’, Haddon-Cave stated
that compensation would only be paid after a pegged rate between the HKD and ster-
ling was restored.62 The British asserted their intention to return to a fixed parity within
six months, in time for their entry to the EEC at the start of , so the Hong Kong
government proposed to await this new parity to re-establish the HKD/£ rate. HSBC
responded that the government was in breach of contract and several weeks of wran-
gling ensued.63 In August , HSBC was secretly able to negotiate a release of up
to £m of their HKD certificates at the prevailing exchange rate to allow them to
intervene in the foreign exchange market to stabilise the USD/HKD rate and
to supply the Bank of China with sterling.64 The Exchange Fund paid compensation
to HSBC on the released certificates and the corresponding sterling deposits were can-
celled. The limit was adjusted to £m in November  and by the end of the year,
HSBChad taken out £. m, ofwhich£mwas inDecember alone.Up to the end
of November this cost the Exchange Fund £. m in compensation to HSBC for
depreciated sterling.65 Meanwhile, on  October  the £/USD rate fell below
Table . Major interventions in the HKD exchange market by the Exchange Fund –
(−sales/+ purchases)
 July– August  −USD. and −£. m
– February  −USD m
May  −USD m
July  +USD m
Source: Exchange Fund report on the accounts for . HSBC, Chairman’s files, /Box
.. Exchange Fund report on the accounts for . TNA FCO/. These major
interventions were in addition to ‘smoothing operations [that] were from time to time
conducted in conjunction with the Exchange Fund’s bankers’.
61 G. M. Sayer to Haddon-Cave,  July . HSBC, Financial secretary re: devaluation and compen-
sation –, Chairman’s papers, /Box ..
62 Haddon-Cave to D. B. Millar, chair of Exchange Banks Assoc c/o Chartered Bank,  July .
HSBC, Financial secretary re: devaluation and compensation –, Chairman’s papers
/Box ..
63 Letter from G. M. Sayer to Haddon-Cave,  August . HSBC, Chairman’s papers, /Box
..
64 Haddon-Cave to G. M. Sayer,  August . HSBC, Chairman’s papers, /Box ..
65 Exchange Fund report of accounts for . HSBC, Chairman’s papers, /Box ..
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the London guarantee threshold and the clock started to tick on the -day deadline
after which London would have to pay compensation.
Despite receiving some compensation for their sterling assets, at the end of October
 HSBC announced that they would diversify their reserves (which amounted to
about £ m) by £- m per month starting in January . The Hong Kong
government feared that this would pull overall reserves into a breach of the Sterling
Agreement, thus making them ineligible for the UK guarantee that they relied on
to compensate their domestic banks.66 In November Governor McLehose wrote
to London setting out his predicament. Under its own scheme the Hong Kong gov-
ernment guaranteed the HKD value of  per cent of the banks’ sterling assets. But
the Hong Kong government could only claim compensation from the UK if the rate
fell belowUS$. and then only for  per cent of the value of official sterling assets.
Since revaluation of sterling against the USD at the end of  and then floating of
the pound from June , for every  per cent that sterling floated down the HKD
value of the colony’s sterling balances fell by HKD m, and when sterling was
between USD. and . this fell entirely out of HK government funds since no
compensation was payable from London until the sterling rate fell below USD..
The gap between the two guarantee schemes was therefore building up a substantial
future liability for the government. For this reason, abandoning the sterling peg made
it even more vital that Hong Kong should negotiate a favourable new sterling agree-
ment with the UK, or be allowed to reduce its MSP to  per cent to allow banks to
diversify and reduce their claim on the Hong Kong government.67
The solution reached after financial secretary Haddon-Cave came to negotiate in
London in November was that Hong Kong banks could sell £ m of sterling over
five months with a limit of £ m per day and £ m per week. Haddon-Cave
decided to restrict the diversification to the HSBC because of its large note-issuing
burden and because it held more sterling than all the other banks put together.
Chartered Bank was reported to be content with this arrangement.68 The scheme
superseded the secret agreement for the Fund to redeem the HSBC’s HKD certificates,
accelerating the redemption considerably to an upper limit of £ m rather than
£ m.69 As it turned out, the Bank of China’s demand for sterling used up £m
of HSBCs sterling reserves and there was no diversification into other currencies.70
As soon as the HKD guarantee level was breached in July, Haddon-Cave con-
sidered making compensation payments in sterling but he quickly rejected this
66 Governor MacLehose to FCO,  October . BE OV/.
67 Note from the Governor to the Chancellor, dated  November  and delivered  November
. TNA T/.
68 Letter from G. M. Sayer to Haddon-Cave,  December . HSBC, Financial secretary re: deva-
luation and compensation –, Chairman’s papers, /Box .. It was also administratively
easier to limit the scheme to one bank.
69 Correspondence between Haddon-Cave and Sayer,  December  and  January . HSBC,
Financial secretary re: devaluation and compensation -, Chairman’s papers, /Box ..
70 Payton note for the record seen by BE Governor L O’Brien,  May . BE OV/.
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solution since it would place a large burden on the Exchange Fund, introducing an
exchange risk since the compensation from London would not be paid for some
months. Meanwhile, the value of the Fund’s sterling deposits at the banks fell
below the value of the HKD certificates against which they were issued. The solution
was to change the value of existing HKD certificates to reflect the new prevailing
exchange rates. In addition, the Exchange Fund issued a new series of HKD debt cer-
tificates ‘in respect of the amount by which the value of the existing certificates is
reduced’. These were separate from those held as the counterpart of sterling deposit
receipts and bore interest at  per cent p.a. payable by the Fund in HKD. In
essence, the Exchange Fund issued new HKD CoIs as an initial adjustment claim
on the Fund to be exchanged at the prevailing exchange rate once a new parity
was set.71 The impact was again to offset the contractionary impact of the appreciation
of the HKD on the money supply. The HSBC and Chartered both objected to the
scheme, insisting that they were entitled to compensation payments in sterling dated
from October. While reluctantly accepting the new HKD certificates, they tried to
get the interest paid from  October rather than  January as proposed by Haddon-
Cave, and at the London market rate rather than the proposed  per cent.72
The new activities undertaken by the Exchange Fund led to calls in London for the
Hong Kong government to begin to sell Treasury bills to the banks instead of borrow-
ing their HKD to buy up their sterling assets. This was rejected by Haddon-Cave as it
had been by his predecessor, John Cowperthwaite. The Hong Kong government had
no borrowing requirements at this time and no interest in creating a local Treasury bill
or moneymarket.73 In his proposal to the Executive Council in January  to set up
the Exchange Fund guarantee, Cowperthwaite had dismissed issuing Treasury bills to
take over the banks’ assets partly on the basis of ‘the problem of setting interest rates,
and so interfering with the internal interest structure in Hong Kong’. The govern-
ment wanted no role in setting interest rates. In addition, Cowperthwaite wanted
to let the banks continue to manage the underlying sterling assets.74 He thus did
not want the contractionary impact of sales of government paper. More fundamen-
tally, Cowperthwaite and Haddon-Cave resisted issuing Treasury bills because this
71 Haddon-Cave to the chair of Exchange Banks Association, dated  December  and forwarded
by him on  January . HSBC, Financial secretary re: devaluation and compensation –,
Chairman’s papers, /Box ..
72 Letter fromG.M. Sayer to Haddon-Cave,  January . Letter from chief manager Chartered Bank
to Haddon-Cave,  January . HSBC, Financial secretary re: Devaluation and compensation
–, Chairman’s papers, /Box ..
73 G. R. Bell (Treasury) to Haddon-Cave setting out summary of their talks in London,  November
. Agreed by Chancellor of the Exchequer, who wanted to make local issue of government paper
a prerequisite for his agreement, but was willing to let it go in the end. Memo by A.M. Bailey passing
on Chancellor’s views,  November . TNA T/.
74 Memorandum for Executive Council, ‘Sterling exchange guarantees’,  January . TNA
FCO/.
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would encourage public expectations about government spending that would be dif-
ficult to resist if there was an easy way to raise short-term debt.75
VII
When the peg to sterling was abandoned, it no longer made sense to continue to
issue certificates of indebtedness against sterling since the HKD/£ exchange rate
was no longer stable. In fact, however, the Exchange Fund went even further and
no longer required the deposit of any foreign exchange, thus breaking the strict
currency board rules. Note-issuing banks were allowed to pledge HKD balances to
the Exchange Fund to back new issues. Ghose and Greenwood explain the accumu-
lation of HKD balances as a way for the Fund to have resources to intervene in the
foreign exchange market to protect the exchange rate of the HKD to the USD.
The HSBC was no longer the buyer of last resort as it had been under the sterling
exchange rate peg and the Fund began to intervene in the market directly (although
unsuccessfully according to Greenwood because they operated through the banking
system).76
From July  all CoI were issued and redeemed against specified HKD accounts by
the note-issuing banks. Up until this point, increases in note issue were covered by a
payment of sterling from the issuing banks’ London office to the Hong Kong govern-
ment and, likewise, when a reduction happened, sterling was received by HSBC in
London from the government. As W. Purves described to G. M. Sayer, ‘subsequent
to the HKD being pegged to the USD we have credited a special Hong Kong
Government No  Account with HKD to cover any increase in our unauthorised
note issue and have debited this account in respect of any reduction’. The new
assets of the Fund created after July  thereby moved from the Crown Agents’
accounts in London to the note-issuing banks’ balance sheets in Hong Kong. This
is the fundamental mistake of which Greenwood, Latter and Goodstadt are critical,
but the evidence presented here has shown that a large amount of the Fund’s assets
had been deposited with the banking system from November  onwards.
For the year as a whole, in  a total of HKD.bn of certificates of indebted-
ness was issued, of which  per cent were against HKD balances. A total of
HKD.bn of certificates of indebtedness was redeemed, of which  per cent
were settled in HKD.77 HSBC noted that for the year  the net increase in
HSBC notes backed by certificates of indebtedness against HKD balances was
HKD m as against the total CoI outstanding of HKD m. In the first half of
75 D. G. Holland to Stuart,  July . TNA FCO/. On the reluctance of the Hong Kong gov-
ernment to spend see Goodstadt, Profits, Politics and Panics and Uneasy Partners: The Conflict between
Public Interest and Private Profit in Hong Kong (Hong Kong, ).
76 Greenwood, Hong Kong’s Link.
77 Exchange Fund report on accounts . HSBC, Chairman’s papers /Box ..
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, the net increase by HSBC was a further HKD. m.78 HSBC paid interest of
 per cent p.a. to the government on this special account and surpluses were some-
times transferred by the government to call or fixed deposits on which higher interest
was paid. Purves also noted that ‘government appear to have passed some if not all of
their exchange rate support operations through the special account and appear to have
purchased foreign exchange from a number of non-note issuing banks in the Colony’.
While the net increase in HKD-backed CoI was quite modest, the Fund’s new
policy raised a challenge almost immediately when certificates needed to be
redeemed, but the Exchange Fund did not own any HKD balances so the govern-
ment had to provide a temporary advance to the Fund.79 As a result, the Exchange
Fund for the first time opened HKD bank accounts even before any HKD certificates
of indebtedness had to be issued. By the end of the year, the Fund had accumulated
£. m in HKD balances at call plus a further £ m on three- to six-month
deposit. This represented just under half of all money at call and almost  per cent
of all non-sterling fixed deposits. A further impact of the switch to accepting HKD
balances was that the liquid portion of the Fund’s assets increased sharply because
of the increase in HKD bank accounts (although this was also due to EFAC’s decision
not to buy foreign currency securities, having got permission to do so).
Table  shows some key features of the Exchange Fund’s balance sheet, which
shows the large size of the Sterling Guarantee Scheme compared to the assets of
the Fund. A second striking feature is that the cover for the currency issue fell
below  per cent in  and . A very limited amount of diversification
began in  for liquid assets only. Finally, the Fund accumulated £ m worth
of HKD deposits in the first six months of the new regime after July , but the
following year, these assets were run down to £. m suggesting that the HKD
received from banks in exchange for CoI were invested in foreign exchange.
Through to , sterling investments still dominated; a week before the HKDwas
floated in November  Sayer of HSBC urged the financial secretary to diversify
out of sterling despite the losses that would be taken on the gilt portfolio, remarking
that ‘the existing exposure is commercially unacceptable’.80
Table  shows how the losses were accumulated in the early s due to the
appreciation of HKD liabilities against sterling and the depreciation in the market
value of sterling investments. Also evident is the illiquid nature of the investment port-
folio, which was still  per cent invested in securities by , and a full  per cent of
total assets was invested in maximum yield assets that were losing market value fast.
It is clear from this new data that the collapse of the international monetary system
posed a huge burden on the operation of the Exchange Fund because it took over
exchange rate risk from the banking system.
78 W. Purves to G. M. Sayer,  July . HSBC, Chairman’s papers, /Box ..
79 Exchange Fund report of accounts for . HSBC, Chairman’s papers, /Box ..
80 Letter from Sayer to financial secretary, November . HSBC Chairman’s files, /Box ..
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Table . Hong Kong Exchange Fund accounts
        (Sept)
Total assets excl. Guarantee Scheme . . . . . . . .
CoI . . . . . . . .
Cover % . . . . . . . .
Sterling Guarantee Scheme deposits   . .  .  
Money at call . . . . . . . .
HKD balances      . . .
Sterling balances . . . . . . . .
USD balances      . . .
US Tbills       . .
Fixed deposits      . . .
DM      . . .
SwFr      . . .
BelFr      . . .
USD      . . incl. in cash total
HKD      . . 
Investments . . . . . . . .
Gold .
Source: - TNA FCO/, – TNA FCO/, – HSBC Group Archive, Chairman’s files Box ., – TNA
FCO/, September  HSBC Asia-Pacific Archive, HK  N Exchange fund balance sheets, –. Sterling Guarantee Scheme:
the end  figure is February .
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Table . Key features of the Hong Kong Exchange Fund accounts, –
Gross
surplus for
the year
Appreciation or
depreciation on
assets
Exchange rate
losses (net) on
sterling
devaluation
Appropriation of
development loan
fund
Accumulated
surplus carried
forward
Investments in
securities (% total
assets)
Money held
at call or
short notice
(%)
 .  . . .
 . . . . .
 . . . . .
 . −. . . . .
 . −. . . .
 . . . . .
 . −. −. . . .
 . −. −. . . .
 . −. −. . . .
 . −. . . .
 . . . . .
 . −. −. . . .
 −. −. −. −. . .
 −. −. −. −. . .
(Sept)
Note: Valuation of assets in column  includes gains and losses on sales and redemptions as well as market valuation.
Sources: Exchange Fund report of accounts for . HSBC Group Archive, Chairman’s papers, /Box .. Data for  from TNA
FCO/, for September  HSBC Asia-Pacific Archive HK–Exchange fund balance sheets, –.
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VIII
In December , Haddon-Cave reported to LegCo that the liability of the
Exchange Fund under the guarantee scheme was about £ m, less £ m due
from London under the sterling exchange guarantee. Against this, the Exchange
Fund had earned about £ m from the cost charged for the HKD cover.81 This
turned out to be a substantial underestimate. From end May to  July , Hong
Kong’s sterling reserves rose by £ m to a total of about £ m, of which a sub-
stantial proportion according to Haddon-Cave was due to the demand for forward
cover by banks.82 The lowest level of the Fund’s special sterling deposits in 
was in February, when deposits were about £ m. As sterling fell, banks rushed
to buy HKD CoI and the financial secretary gained approval to increase the Fund’s
borrowing limit from HKD m to HKD m on the day sterling floated on
 June. By  July, when the scheme was frozen, the Fund had the maximum
HKD m in HKD CoI outstanding, equivalent to deposits of £ m.83 The
delay in making a decision about the exchange rate regime for Hong Kong thus
increased the Exchange Fund’s liability considerably.
The Exchange Fund guarantee expired on  September , when compen-
sation became due. Over the life of the scheme the Exchange Fund had earned
£. m in interest and exchange margins, i.e. the ‘cost’ of the cover to the banks.
Total payments by the Fund (including the interest on the new certificates issued
in January ) amounted to £. m so the net cost to the Fund was £. m.
The London guarantee generated revenue for the Fund of £. m in terms of com-
pensation for losses of the £/USD exchange rate during October–November ,
which covered part of the payments under the Exchange Fund guarantee but still left a
burden of £. m on total assets of £ m at the end of . The HSBC’s
arrangement to redeem some of the HKD CoI from January  resulted in a
reduction of £. m before  September , costing the Fund £. m in
compensation on withdrawals made at an average rate of HKD./£. The early
withdrawal of close to half of the total sterling on deposit cost the Fund some
money in interest and exchange. The rate used to wind up the scheme in
September was HKD. =£ on the balance outstanding of £. m. Most
banks (all but three) chose to be paid in HKD rather than sterling and this forced
the Fund to buy HKD from the government’s general account.
An important implication for the Hong Kong government’s guarantee was that it
pushed the reserve backing for the note issue well below  per cent in . In 
the cover was  per cent, falling to  per cent in , but was only . per cent
at the end of . This was kept highly secret to avoid rocking public confidence in
the HKD, described by Haddon-Cave as ‘about the most closely guarded secret in
81 Speech by Haddon-Cave in LegCo,  December .
82 Ibid.
83 Exchange Fund report of accounts for . HSBC, Chairman’s papers, /Box ..
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Hong Kong’ because if it became known that the cover had fallen below  per cent
‘this could have a disastrous effect on public confidence’. At the time, Haddon-Cave
expected that the  per cent cover would not be restored for another four to five
years. He decided not to transfer government funds to the Exchange Fund to make
up the shortfall since this could be detected by the public in the annual budget,
but fiscal reserves were earmarked against the shortfall and this reduced the amount
available for development projects.84 At the time, Governor MacLehose and
Haddon-Cave were in conflict over MacLehose’s desire for greater development
spending and Haddon-Cave’s conservatism. There was a precedent for a shortfall in
cover. In  cover was almost  per cent but it had fallen to . per cent in
 due to the decision to honour thewartime duress note issue.85 In  the finan-
cial secretary declared that the assets of the Exchange Fund once again equalled the
value of the CoI.86
The compensation payments for , combined with losses on the sales of assets
and depreciation of gilts resulted in an unprecedented loss for that year of £ m and a
deficit carried forward to  of £. m. The Fund would have been able to gen-
erate a small surplus to cover the depreciation on assets and losses on exchange because
of the substantial surplus of £. m brought forward from , but the burden of
the compensation payments created the deficit. The following year offered no relief
(despite another £. m received under the London guarantee) as the market value of
assets continued to fall and the sterling value of the Fund’s HKD liabilities appreciated
so that the cover had fallen below  per cent by September.
IX
The Exchange Fund underwent a profound transformation during the collapse of
the global fixed exchange rate system. Starting in , the financial secretary and
the note-issuing banks began to devise ways for the Exchange Fund to increase the
range of its activities based on close cooperation between the financial secretary
and the note-issuing banks, both within the Exchange Fund Advisory Committee
and outside it. At the heart of these innovations was the system’s reliance on the
HSBC to protect the pegged exchange rate to sterling. As sterling weakened, the
HSBC threatened to stop supporting the rate unless it was offered forward cover.
The mechanism for this was to bring the sterling assets of the banking system into
the Exchange Fund not by selling Treasury bills but through sales of HKD-denomi-
nated non-negotiable bonds. The proceeds were re-deposited with the banks and the
banks were reassured that they could treat the sterling as if it were still an owned asset
84 Memo by Andrew C. Stuart (head of Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Dept, FCO) for Mr Holland,
noting a meeting with Haddon-Cave in Hong Kong the previous week. TNA FCO/.
85 Minutes of EFAC  July  reported on  cover. Memorandum to accompany the accounts of
the Exchange Fund for the year ended  December . HSBC, Chairman’s file /Box ..
86 Ghose, The Banking System of Hong Kong, p. .
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of the bank, now with a guaranteed HKD value. To the extent that the HKD bonds
were used to back the issue of new currency notes (which was allowed under the
scheme) the backing for the note issue was shifted from sterling assets held by the
Crown Agents in London to sterling deposits at Hong Kong banks. This change in
 marked a move away from the operation of an orthodox currency board
much earlier than the innovation of  when special HKD accounts were used
to cover note issue. Currency boards rarely operate on completely orthodox terms
as the temptation to intervene is often too great to resist. This was recognised
when Hong Kong returned to a currency board system in  when it was deter-
mined that the Exchange Fund ‘shall be used for such purposes as the Financial
Secretary thinks fit affecting, either directly or indirectly the exchange value of the
currency of Hong Kong and for other purposes incidental thereto’. In the s
when the duties of the Fund were more closely circumscribed to ‘regulating the
exchange value of the currency of Hong Kong’, the government and the banks
clearly saw the Exchange Fund also as a resource to moderate the impact of fluctuating
exchange rates on banks’ assets, not as an automatic mechanism but through deliberate
intervention. The outcome was that the assets of the Fund were recycled through the
banking system and there were increased risks to the reserves of the Fund. Given the
illiquid nature of the Fund’s reserves this proved a particularly costly strategy.
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